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Abstract
This paper conceptualizes populism in an institutional economics context. 
Examining the literature on populism in political science, it subscribes to the view 
that populism is a degraded form of democracy that holds elections in regular 
intervals as rituals of popular legitimation, but undermines pluralism and diminishes 
effective political choice. Based on the theory of transaction cost economics, 
the paper argues that populism is a form of government that reduces political 
uncertainties inherently present in liberal democracies, and hence mitigates 
political transaction costs. At times of crises and a mismatch between formal and 
informal institutions conditioning political exchange, demand for such a restricted 
form of democracy rises. This is what happened in Hungary towards the end of the 
2000s, in a period characterized by fiscal stabilization and the socially costly impact 
of the global financial crisis.
JEL codes: P10, P16, P48, P51, P52
1. Introduction
This paper examines populism from an institutional economics angle. Such an approach is 
not unprecedented but calls for some elaboration: Why do we need an institutional economics 
approach to populism? My answer is because we want to understand what makes populism 
a rational political choice for an increasing number of people in an increasing number of 
countries. I assume the underlying reasons have to do with the terms of political exchange 
in democracies, or to use an expression found in the institutional economics literature: with 
political transaction costs.
1  Versions of this paper were presented at the 2nd International Economic Forum on Reform, Transition and Growth at 
Corvinus University of Budapest in November 2016 and at the departmental seminar of Central European University’s 
Department of Political Science in Budapest in October 2017. Comments by seminar and conference participants, as 
well as by András Bozóki are gratefully acknowledged. 
2  Assistant Professor, Corvinus University of Budapest, Faculty of Economics, Department of Comparative and 
Institutional Economics. Email: zoltan.adam@uni-corvinus.hu
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Such an exercise may serve multiple functions. First, it can shed light on the mechanisms of 
populism, a political technique feared by a lot of devoted democrats, and supported by a lot of 
others. Second, it can help understand the institutional economics of democracy by revealing 
the social and economic circumstances under which democracy can be expected to thrive. 
Third, it may enable a meaningful differentiation among versions of populism: left and right, 
democratic and authoritarian.
Hence, this paper lies at the intersection of two different literatures in social sciences: 
(i) the political science research on populism, and (ii) the economics of transaction costs. 
In what follows, I first present a literature review on populism, drawing on contemporary 
political science research in section 2. Next I elaborate on political transaction costs and their 
applicability to populism in section 3. I attempt at situating my theoretical arguments into the 
empirical case of contemporary Hungary, using Viktor Orbán’s praxis in power as an example 
of authoritarian populism in section 4. The paper concludes in section 5. 
2. What is populism? A literature review
Populism is a political ideology that questions the legitimacy of traditional political elites by 
claiming to be the true, and the only true representative of people. In consequence, populists 
have a tendency for undermining political plurality by questioning the legitimacy of their 
rivals (Müller 2016). For populists, ‘people’ themselves represent justice and morality (Shils 
1956), hence they claim to establish a direct, non-institutionalized link between government 
and the electorate.3
Technically speaking, populism is a modernized version of charismatic rule. In Max Weber’s 
classic treatment, a charismatic ruler “derives his authority not from an established order 
and enactments, as if it were an official competence, and not from custom or feudal fealty, 
as under patrimonialism. He gains and retains it solely by proving his powers in practice. 
He must work miracles, if he wants to be a prophet. He must perform heroic deeds, if he 
wants to be a warlord. Most of all, his divine mission must prove itself by bringing wellbeing 
[emphasis in the original] to his faithful followers; if they do not fare well, he obviously is 
not the god-sent master” (Weber 1978 [1922], p. 1114). In this sense, populist politicians are 
modern-day charismatic rulers, who retain power as long as they are seen to work miracles: 
alter social and/or international hierarchical relations, change the economic system, bring 
about a true sense of ‘social justice’ for subordinated social groups often labeled ‘the people’ by 
undermining the authority of discredited ‘elites’ (also see Gurov and Zankina 2013, Hawkins 
2003, Tismaneanu 2000).
Theoretically speaking, populism is a ‘thin-centered’ political ideology attached to a 
broader, more established ideological appeal (Stanley 2008). Populism typically uses more 
elaborate and politically better established ideologies to carve out a unique selling point in 
3  Direct, non-institutionalized links include leader-dominated political movements and parties, referenda and other 
forms of direct participation in political life by people. In Venezuela, Hugo Chavez held multi-hour long public hearings 
broadcasted nationally (Ellner 2012). In Russia, President Putin hold publicly broadcasted meetings with cabinet 
ministers questioning their record in applying public policies (White and Mcallister 2008).
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the political market. In cases of rightwing populists this is typically nationalism or another 
form of rightwing authoritarianism. In case of leftwing populists, this is most often a version 
of socialism (Mudde 2004).
Yet, populism also has its own ideological trademark. As Cas Mudde argued, populism is 
“an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and 
antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics 
should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people” (Mudde 2004, p. 
543). Hence, populisms are meant to represent the true views and interests of those sidelined 
and subordinated by selfish and corrupt elites. In other words, populism includes those who 
had been excluded by traditional elites. 
Importantly, this is not necessarily a matter of democratic representation. Populists claim 
to be the true voice of people irrespective of the number of people they represent in terms of 
electoral results. After all, the volonté générale’s social and political status cannot depend on 
the sheer number of people realizing its true and inevitable manifestation. And who decides 
about what the volonté générale is of course are the populists.
In a similar vein, Federico Finchelstein places populism in a context of post-totalitarianism. 
He argues that modern Latin American populism, most saliently embodied in Peronism4, is 
the post-WWII version of totalitarianism, or “an electoral form of post-fascism” (Finchelstein 
2014, p. 469). In his account, populism refuses to accept any institutionalized constraint on 
executive power but is reluctant to introduce explicitly totalitarian rule. Although populism 
embraces electoral democracy, “[i]n populism, the legitimacy of the leader is not only based 
in the former’s ability to represent the electorate but also on the belief that the leader’s will 
goes far beyond the mandate of political representation. […] The elected leaders act as the 
personification of popular sovereignty exerting a great degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the 
majorities that have elected them. […] As an authoritarian version of electoral democracy, 
populism invoked the name of the people to stress a form of vertical leadership, to downplay 
political dialogue, and to solve a perceived crisis of representation by suppressing democratic 
checks and balances” (Finchelstein 2014, p. 477).
In a similar theoretical fashion, Takis Pappas (2016) argued that populism is “democratic 
illiberalism”, or in other words “populism is always democratic but never liberal” (pp. 28-29). 
This is because populists, on one hand, need to rely on popular legitimation so that they can 
claim to be the true and the only true voice of people. Hence, they hold elections. On the other 
hand, they – as the true and only true voice of people – cannot accept losing elections. As 
there are no better (i.e. more credible, just, morally better entitled, etc.) representatives of 
the people than they are, any contradicting electoral results should be outright dismissed. 
Cases in point are Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump: Orbán questioned the legitimacy of both 
the 2002 and the 2006 Hungarian parliamentary elections that he both lost, whereas Trump 
called the electoral process ‘rigged’ before the 2016 US presidential election and declared 
before Election Day that he would not concede defeat in case Hillary Clinton won. 
As Jan-Werner Müller (2016) put it, populism is “a degraded form of democracy that 
promises to make good on democracy’s highest ideals (‘Let the people rule!’).” This is to say 
that populism seeks to gain electoral support for an anti-liberal political agenda that aims 
4 Juan Peron was President of Argentina in 1946-1955 and in 1973-1974.
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at reducing the effective choice that people can make in politics. The question is, however, if 
political regimes built and dominated by populists can be meaningfully called democracies. 
Müller’s answer is an emphatic no: Populists are anti-pluralists and anti-pluralists cannot be 
democrats, as democracy is per se about pluralism. This answer appears to be in line with that 
of Kornai (2016), who claims that democracy cannot be illiberal.
Nevertheless, an influential part of the populism literature – and some important political 
actors referring to it – consider populism an important democratic force. Ernesto Laclau 
(2005) argues that populism is instrumental in mobilizing politically and economically 
oppressed masses against democratically unaccountable technocratic elites, multinational 
companies and international institutions. Newly emerging leftwing populist parties such as 
Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain make explicit references to such views, but older, 
more traditional leftwing parties such as Die Linke in Germany can also be considered 
leftwing democratic or progressive populists. Other leading leftwing political actors such as 
Bernie Sanders in the US and Jeremy Corbyn in the UK can be labelled – and at times are self-
proclaimed – leftwing progressive populists.
Referring to their examples and emphasizing the structural weakness of democratic 
legitimation in capitalism, Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) endorse populism as a potentially 
progressive political force. In the fashion of Laclau, they raise the problem of democratic 
legitimacy with respect to such politically influential but democratically not (or in their 
view not sufficiently) accountable actors as multinational businesses, central banks and 
international organizations as the International Monetary Fund and the European Union. 
In this context and understanding, populism is indeed democratic – at time almost 
revolutionary so. The biggest populist success of past decades from this point of view has 
probably been the rise of Lula da Silva and his Workers’ Party that had truly transformed 
politics in Brazil and lifted millions of Brazilians from poverty. However, neither Lula, nor 
Sanders, Corbyn or Syriza leader Alexis Tsipras are populists in the sense I use the term in 
this paper: Neither of them can be considered anti-pluralist, seeking to restrict democratic 
political choice. They may pursue populist economic policies in the sense of expansionary 
fiscal policies that at times may well prove unsustainable, this does not render them politically 
illiberal, however.
Yet, authoritarian populism well might be leftwing. Classics in this brand include Juan 
Peron of Argentina and Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, but Rafael Correa of Ecuador is also 
among lead representatives (Ellner 2012, Horowitz 2012). Evo Morales of Bolivia is hovering 
around the edge of the category (de la Torre 2016). Europe has not seen as many leftwing 
populists, but according to Pappas (2014), Andreas Papandreou of Greece and his Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (Pasok), established in 1974, can be considered one. Papandreou was 
populist, argues Pappas, for three reasons: (1) He was a highly charismatic, unconstrained 
party leader, with a highly nationalistic agenda, mobilizing against established elites; (2) He 
advocated strong government involvement in the economy and pursued unsustainable fiscal 
policies; and (3) He heavily relied on clientele building and government-created rents. Yet, this 
occurred in an institutional context characterized by a competitive electoral system and the 
provision of basic political rights. Hence, Papandreau does not appear to be an authoritarian 
populists, even if he was highly charismatic and built a clientele.
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Similarly, rightwing populists are not always authoritarian. Silvio Berlusconi of Italy, 
although also highly charismatic and relying on a clientele built around his personal authority, 
did not create an authoritarian regime for the simple reason that he could not overcome all 
the checks and balances Italy had been endowed with. Boyko Borisov of Bulgaria can be also 
seen as rightwing clientele-building populist, exercising unconstrained, personality-based 
rule within his own political party (Zankina 2016). Andrej Babis of the Czech Republic is yet 
another case of unconstrained personal rule within his own party, based on clientele building 
and charisma. Yet, neither Borisov, nor Babis have been able to dismantle the system of 
checks and balances in their respective countries, in contrast to what had happened in Peron’s 
Argentina, Chavez’ Venezuela or Orbán’s Hungary. 
Finally, another distinction has been made in the populism literature by Rogers Brubaker 
(2017) who differentiates between liberal and illiberal populisms. Observing that a significant 
number of North-West-European (NWE) right wing populist parties have recently shifted 
towards a distinctively liberal direction, Brubaker argues that a new type of individualistic, 
secular, enlightened populism appears to be emerging. This should be seen – he claims – to 
be derived from the ‘Pim Fortuyn moment’ that placed – first in the Netherlands, than across 
a large part of Western Europe – populism in a new social and political context. As opposed 
to traditional populists, Fortuynian populists stand up for individual freedoms, including 
those of women and sexual minorities, whereas depicting groups of society adhering to pre-
enlightenment, traditional social values to be the enemies. These are, of course, typically 
immigrant communities with Muslim backgrounds. 
This new populism is liberal and ‘civilizational’ in its social values, while it defends the 
liberties of ‘enlightened’ European societies against the ‘anti-liberal aggression’ of non-
European immigrants. The protection of individual freedoms, however, do not apply for 
the latter, and those claiming them individual rights and adhere to multiculturalism are 
regarded part of an oppressive leftwing social, political and intellectual elite exhibiting the 
‘dictatorship of political correctness.’ Rightwing civilizational populism considers oppressing 
the enemies of European civilization legitimate and indeed inevitable. Elements of this quasi-
liberal populism, argues Brubaker, can be traced in the Freedom Party of Austria, France’s 
National Front, the Netherland’s Party for Freedom, the Swiss People’s Party, Belgium’s 
Vlaams Belang, or the Danish People’s Party. They all subscribe to secularism, individualism, 
equality of women and homosexuals, and the values of western enlightenment in general, 
whereas all express markedly negative sentiments towards immigrants and especially those 
of Muslim backgrounds. 
In contrast, East European rightwing populists such as Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and 
Lech Kaczynski’s PiS, do not appear to join this club. They keep distancing themselves 
from individualism and the values of western enlightenment, while sticking to a kind of 
communitarian vision of politics in which individuals are expected to subordinate themselves 
to the community manifested in the ‘nation.’ Hence, East European rightwing authoritarian 
populism remains to be anti-liberal, not only vis-à-vis external enemies but also within their 
home societies. As opposed to the ‘enlightened’ liberal righwing populism of Western Europe, 
East European rightwing populists use explicit religious references and identify themselves 
as protectors of Christianity. In the Polish case, this means a reference to a ‘closed’, illiberal 
version of Catholicism and an alliance with its representatives within the Polish Catholic 
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Church (Stanley 2016). In the Hungarian case, in turn, this has little to do with religious 
values or theological concepts of a good society. It is rather a secularized surrogate religion 
what Hungarian rightwing populism creates (Ádám and Bozóki 2016a), and hence it is also 
‘civilizational’, although this is a considerably less individualistic, enlightenment-based and 
liberal civilization than the one referenced by Brubaker’s NWE populists.
3. Populism and political transaction costs
The notion of transaction costs in institutional economics refers to the costs of economic 
exchange. These include (i) search and information costs, (ii) costs of bargaining and 
contracting, and (iii) costs of policing and enforcing contracts (Coase 1937, Williamson 1985). 
Not all types of economic transactions carry significant transaction costs, though. Recurring 
market transactions typically do not imply substantial uncertainties and hence neither 
impose large transaction costs on transacting partners (Williamson 1979). That is to say, 
one can buy or sell a loaf of bread in the shop around the corner with facing practically no 
information, bargaining and enforcing costs. Efficient financial markets also carry very low 
transaction costs: Information is symmetric, market participants are numerous, transactions 
are standardized, and completed fast and transparently.
Societies develop formal and informal institutions to mitigate transaction costs. Formal 
institutions include laws and mechanisms of sanctioning unlawful behavior. Informal 
institutions are norms and customs transacting partners adopt and obey to. The breach of 
informal institutions does not entail formalized sanctions yet it typically brings about severe 
financial and/or non-financial disadvantages (North 1991). Institutions in modern economies 
are capable of handling complex exchanges keeping transaction costs sufficiently low. In 
other words, economic quality is closely associated to institutional quality, whereas the latter 
depends on both formal and informal institutions and their mutual compatibility.5
Governance is about the management of transaction costs. In the classic treatment of 
Coase (1937), firms are conceptualized as organizations producing institutional mechanisms 
handling transaction costs of complex production processes. As producing cars, skyscrapers 
and collateralized corporate loans typically require the cooperation of numerous individuals 
who need to work together in a disciplined manner, they engage in collective action carried 
out in hierarchical organizations called firms. In other words, vertical integration tend to be 
more efficient in complex production processes than horizontal market relations. Yet, even 
this has been changing as new information and production technologies transform industries 
and loosely integrated networks become increasingly competitive vis-à-vis hierarchical firms 
(Hámori and Szabó 2016).
Political governance is also about the management of transaction costs. It is meant to 
maintain, regulate and control political exchange at reasonably low transaction costs. 
5  North famously referred to the potential mismatch between formal and informal institutions. Privatization can be done 
overnight, but the informal institutions within which private property and other core institutions of capitalism rest 
takes much longer to develop, he said with reference to the process of post-communist transformation in his Nobel 
lecture (North 1994). 
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Political exchanges are social interactions influencing the allocation of power, wealth and 
prestige in society (cf. Downs 1957). They occur both at national and local levels, and even 
within particular organizations, such as political parties, parliamentary factions, ministerial 
bureaucracies, NGOs, sport clubs, and – for that matter – firms.6 Political transaction costs 
depend on the efficiency of formal and informal institutions determining political exchange 
and their mutual compatibility. These institutions constitute political regimes.
I said in the last sentence of the previous section that populism seeks to establish ‘de-
institutionalized political regimes.’ What I meant was governance without the constraints of 
formal institutions: a direct, informal way of political exchange between rulers and the ruled. 
However, such a form of governance is also based on institutions, of course. 
Any routinized, recurring human interaction is based on institutions, and political 
governance necessarily does so. Yet, instead of formal, transparent and accountable institutions, 
it can rely on informal, non-transparent and non-accountable ones, in which agreements 
on legitimate actions are tacit and – at least to some extent – f luid, while subordination to 
unconstrained power-holders remains the rule. In other words, it is government not based on 
laws (i.e. legally defined, formal rules) but on customs, cultural preferences and the personal 
authority of leaders (who may or may not have Weberian charisma).
When does such a populist form of governance become socially dominant and accepted as a 
legitimate form of government (i.e. socially institutionalized)? My answer is whenever formal 
and informal institutions of political rule do not match, and the formally institutionalized 
course of actions by governments are not any more embedded in a web of informal, culturally 
defined norms and convictions. In other words, when liberal democracy with its entire 
apparatus of mutually constraining, formalistic, impersonal rule breaks down, and political 
transaction costs of democracy rise too high. Then the moment of populism arrives, and 
authoritarian populists can start slashing political transaction costs by reducing political 
choice. They do this various ways, among which I present two widely used political techniques: 
the left—right divide and ingroup-outgroup mechanisms.
3.1. Left- and rightwing populisms
Populism is about slashing political transaction costs by reducing the number of effective 
political alternatives. It is a degraded version of democracy because it constrains genuinely 
free democratic choice. This can be done in distinctively different ways, and populist, 
depending on their ideological orientation and institutional environment, offer different 
political alternatives.
One common distinction is the left—right divide. The camp of leftwing populists consist 
of Juan Peron of Argentina, Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, Rafael Correa of Ecuador and Evo 
Morales of Bolivia in Latin America (de la Torre 2016, Ellner 2012, Horowitz 2012). In contrast, 
Europe has not seen too many leftwing populists, but according to Pappas (2014), Andreas 
6  The institutional economics literature conventionally refers to the costs of setting up and maintaining social and 
political organizations such as political parties and state bureaucracies as political transaction costs (Furubotn – 
Richter, 2005, pp. 55-57). On the other hand, very few political scientists use the notion of political transaction costs in 
their scholarship. One notable exception is Zankina (2016).
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Papandreou of Greece and his Panhellenic Socialist Movement (Pasok), established in 1974, 
can be considered one. 
Pasok was populist, argues Pappas, for three reasons: (1) Papandreou was a highly 
charismatic, unconstrained party leader; Pasok advocated strong government involvement in 
the economy and pursued economic policies characterized by unsustainable fiscal provisions; 
and (3) Papandreou heavily relied on clientele building and the creation and stabilization of 
an us—them social cleavage. 
Other European parties that can be potentially considered leftwing populist are Die 
Linke in Germany, Syriza in Greece and Podemos in Spain, but neither of them are leader-
dominated and rely on clientele building and the creation of social cleavages as much as 
Pasok did. Regulating markets and redistributing to the benefit of the poor does not in itself 
constitute populism as it does not necessarily imply an illiberal approach to power. Hence, 
Jeremy Corbyn of the UK and Bernie Sanders of the US are not populists either in this sense: 
They might be labeled democratic or progressive populists, and they well might be skeptical 
of capitalism, but they cannot be accused of political illiberalism.  
Rightwing populists typically employ authoritarian policies, such as infringing on media 
freedoms and building clienteles through the usage of public resources, and they also tend 
to form leader dominated parties. In contrast to leftwing populists, they typically do not 
pursue pro-poor policies, and a large part of their vote is recruited from the middle classes, 
whom they assist in retaining their social and economic status. Carlos Menem of Argentina, 
Victor Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia, Alberto Fujimori of Peru, and Carlos Salinas de Gortari of 
Mexico are Latin American examples of such policies (Stein 2012, Weyland 1998, Gibson 1997). 
European rightwing populists often exhibit a pro-middle class bias, create leader-dominated 
parties, and seek to deepen social cleavages. Jean-Marie and Marine Le Pen of France, Silvio 
Berlusconi and Umberto Bossi of Italy, Geert Wilders of the Netherlands, Albert Rösti of 
Switzerland and Nigel Farage of the UK are examples in Western Europe. Viktor Orbán of 
Hungary and Jaroslaw Kaczynski of Poland are both rightwing populists in the Eastern part 
of the EU. In a sense, Vladimir Putin of Russia and Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey can be 
also considered rightwing populist as they both rely on democratic legitimacy while pursuing 
distinctively illiberal policies, although their conduct of power appears significantly more 
oppressive than usual in authoritarian populism, and hence their respective political regimes 
gravitate towards outright dictatorship.
3.2. Exclusion and inclusion by populists 
Both left- and rightwing populists seek to reduce political transaction costs by undermining 
the viability of their opposition, hence limiting effective political choice. This way, they create 
political and economic rents that mutually reinforce each other. As such government-sponsored 
rents are difficult to cut back, populist leaders may stay in office for protracted periods, in 
some cases for decades. Populists in power tend to become increasingly authoritarian, as the 
cases of Orbán, Putin and Erdogan demonstrate. However, there is an inevitable trade-off all 
authoritarian leaders face: The less democratic their political regime becomes, the lower the 
genuine popular legitimation they can claim. Although political exchange gets simpler and 
hence political transaction costs decrease as the regime gets increasingly authoritarian, the 
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costs of oppression rise and long-term economic performance tends to deteriorate (Acemoglu 
and Robinson 2000, 2012). Populists, just as any other autocrats, employ ingroup-outgroup 
mechanisms to mitigate this problem.
In fact, governance always includes and excludes. Political actions in general and public 
policies in particular inevitably prefer some groups in comparison to others. Given the 
relative lack of institutionalized constraints on their rule, populist governments are inclined 
to employ ingroup-outgroup mechanisms by which they build political clientele and insure 
the political support of their favored electorate.
Preferential treatment can include various policies related to jobs, incomes, wealth or prices. 
As leftwing populists tend to constrain markets and intensify government involvement in 
the economy, this can manifest itself in job creation and price regulation. Those preferred 
by such policies can be considered ingroups vis-à-vis the regime. Rightwing populists, in 
turn, typically cut taxes on wealth and/or income, and provide beneficial public procurement 
contracts to their business cronies.7
Populists redistribute for those included and extract from those excluded. Most 
typically those included are politically associated with the ‘people’, but their socioeconomic 
characteristics depend on the left—right character of the regime. Leftwing populists tend to 
include the relative poor (although not necessarily the poorest who typically lack any form of 
politically relevant social capital) and exclude some of the rich. Rightwing populists typically 
apply an ethnic and/or religious criteria in their ingroup-outgroup distinction, often provide 
beneficial treatment for middle classes organized into their clienteles.
Inclusion by the regime always mean a deal. Operation of formal political institutions 
is of secondary importance only, as being member of the clientele is more important than 
norms and actions of an impersonal democratic rule. Those who accept informal rules of the 
regime (that at some point might actually be formalized) typically will not protest even if they 
perceive the mechanisms of redistribution unfair and normatively problematic. That is why 
corruption scandals do not work in populist regimes: all those included are ‘corrupted’ in some 
sense. Corruption is not the normatively unacceptable exception but the socially implicitly or 
explicitly approved way of survival in an informally governed, authoritarian regime. Hence, it 
simply does not necessarily make much sense to draw attention to its existence. Of course, it 
exists; this is how the entire society gets by.
Exclusion and inclusion help cut political transaction costs as they reduce effective political 
choice. Those who vote and make other political decisions are controlled through reallocation 
of resources, including information, money and power, by those above them in the power 
pyramid. Hence, society gets re-feudalized, although rituals of mass-approval of power 
remain in place.
7  Political practices of leftwing and rightwing populists are of course not mutually exclusive but well might be mixed by 
actual populists, whether on the left or the right.
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4. The Orbán regime
A prime example of current populist governance is Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. Having served as 
prime minister in 1998-2002, Orbán took over government in 2010 for the second time. As his 
rightwing populist Fidesz party took two-third of parliamentary seats, Orbán could alter the 
entire constitutional system as an unconstrained populist leader (Ádám and Bozóki 2016b). 
Note that a two-third majority was relatively easy to attain in the individual constituency 
based Hungarian electoral system, in which the majority principle has dominated since 1990. 
In consequence, a majoritarian approach to power, generally characterizing populist parties 
and leaders, has been present in Hungary since the regime change, and prevailed both within 
individual political parties and the entire political system (Ádám 2018).
In 2010-14, Orbán made the constitutional system even more majority-based, effectively 
dismantling all checks and balances on government power (Tóth 2012, Kornai 2015). In 2014, 
Fidesz was reelected, and Orbán continued to govern. At the time of writing, he is set to gain 
yet another overwhelming electoral victory at the spring 2018 general elections, and Hungary 
is expected to remain governed by him for at least four more years. His success was based 
on a characteristically authoritarian populist policy mix: He has centralized power, made 
government economically more active, built an extensive clientele, and heavily reallocated 
resources to the benefit of his supporter base. State ownership expanded, income inequalities 
grew, while fiscal redistribution stayed as high as it was before, with significantly less 
redistribution from the rich to the poor, though.
4.1. Left- or right? Right
Although their policies have exhibited a number of leftwing characteristics, Orbán’s 
governments have pursued an explicitly rightwing version of authoritarian populism. 
Ideologically they are nationalistic and define the political community on an ethno-cultural 
basis. Their self-identification has been manifestly rightwing, allegedly standing up for 
conservative and religious values, even if in actual terms this has rather been a secular 
pseudo-religion than Christianity and religious conservatism (Ádám and Bozóki 2016a).
Orbán’s policies explicitly prefer middle class economic interests. First, this is again a 
manifestly declared policy goal: Strengthening an ethno-culturally defined Hungarian 
middle class that supports national interests embodied in local (as opposed to global or 
foreign) political initiatives carries a high priority in Orbán’s political discourse. Second, 
redistribution policies, including policies on taxation and social benefits, have been also 
characterized by strong middle class biases.
Since 2010, Orbán has introduced a f lat income tax that brought about a large reduction 
in tax burden of average and higher incomes whereas it increased the tax burden on low 
incomes. In addition, generous income tax holidays after children made tax burden of middle 
class families particularly low. In contrast, lower income big families simply do not have 
enough revenues to claim these benefits. In the meantime, child benefits, paid after children 
regardless of family income, have not risen but lost part of their real value, particularly hitting 
low income big families, many of them being Roma (Inglot et al. 2012). Generous housing 
finance schemes have been also introduced to the benefit of high income families, able to buy 
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or build new houses. Finally, the polarization of state-administered pensions, started in the 
pre-2010 period, continued as a high replacement ratio and undifferentiated pension hikes 
made middle class pensions grow faster than pensions of lower income earners (Ádám and 
Simonovits 2017).
Some of Orbán’s policies have exhibited a less explicit pro-middle class bias. Importantly, 
utility prices have been administratively cut by the government in 2012-14, significantly 
boosting the popularity of the regime and the reelection chances of Orbán in 2014. Cutting 
utility prices at first sight appears a pro-poor measure, and to some extent it indeed is. 
However, middle classes also enjoy lower utility prices, especially those having a large house. 
Moreover, the utility price cut was part of Orbán’s scheme of redistributing markets of utility 
industries: These were privatized in the 1990s for large foreign firms by the then governing 
Socialists and Liberals, whereas Orbán partly renationalized them after 2010. Cutting utility 
prices was an incentive for foreign firms to withdraw from the market and relinquish their 
previous investments in a formerly friendly, recently hostile-turned business environment 
(Ámon and Deák 2015, pp. 95-96).
Orbán also levied special industry-specific taxes on banking, energy provision, 
telecommunication and food retail trade. Apart from raising additional budgetary revenues, 
these taxes also gave incentives for large foreign companies to leave the Hungarian market, 
and let the government control it directly through regulation, nationalization and – in some 
cases – re-privatization to friendly businesses. The policy goal was to strengthen local capital 
accumulation and support government-sponsored business clienteles through the allocation 
of market shares and preferential government provisions, often at – or beyond – the edge of 
legalized corruption (cf. Fazekas and Tóth 2016, CRCB 2016).8 
4.2. Dynamics of inclusion and exclusion
Successive Orbán governments – like any other authoritarian populists – have always made 
explicit who were ‘us’ and who were ‘them’ from their perspective. Orbán has always placed 
a great political emphasis on creating deep social divisions between his camp and their 
opposition. He has acted like a feudal landlord among his subjects, always appreciating 
loyalty and punishing individualism. Traditionally, the dividing characteristics he used were 
attitudes to the communist past, to the outside world, to national identity and to Christianism.
Ideologically, Orbán’s ‘us’ were the non-communist, ethno-culturally Hungarian, Christian, 
‘civic’ (i.e. non-proletarian) Hungarians. Upon losing the 2002 elections to the Socialists, 
however, he revised this basis of identification by incorporating more plebeian-populist 
elements. He changed his dress-code and, to some extent, even his language, to appear and 
sound more authentically identical with the people. Eventually, in the wake of the global 
financial crisis and the ensuing fiscal stabilization by the then governing center left, Orbán 
made this kind of inclusive ‘us’, consisting both plebeian and aristocratic elements, victorious.
Another important economic and social policy measure playing a major role in creating 
ingroup-outgroup dynamics has been the expansion of public work programs. In these, 
8  Another form of providing government secured rents for friendly businesses was the creation of local tobacco retail 
sales monopolies that were typically allocated among Fidesz-friendly local businesses.
Zoltán Ádám94 What is populism? 
hundreds of thousands of people have been included who otherwise would have typically 
stayed economically inactive. They have earned miserable wages but still enjoyed some degree 
of income stability. To make the program more attractive, the government reduced social 
benefits of those out of work, including both the unemployed and those who had been out of 
the labor market on a permanent basis. 
Public work programs seldom make participants economically more competitive. Instead, 
participants often get stuck in these programs (Cseres-Gergely and Molnár 2015), making 
them dependent on government policies and, in particular, local authorities who directly 
employ them in most public work scheme. Especially in villages and small towns this can 
contribute to the re-feudalization of power relations, while at the same time responding to the 
negative stereotypes of the public about the scores of ‘lazy inactive’ people, among whom the 
Roma are overrepresented (Kertesi and Kézdi 2011). Hence, public work programs have been 
instrumental in making the distinction between included and excluded sections of society 
salient and tangible, and creating a hierarchical relationship between the two. 
Nevertheless, inclusion-exclusion dynamics have been restructured by Orbán since the last 
general elections. The 2014 elections were to a significant extent won by Orbán through utility 
price cuts that symbolized the regulation of markets and the emphasis on living conditions. 
The message was that ordinary people were not any more at the mercy of businesses but were 
protected by the government, delivering tangible financial gains to them at the cost of foreign 
investors. 
Importantly and interestingly, Orbán has formulated a new message since then. With the 
start of the European migrant and refugee crisis in 2015, he gained an opportunity to redefine 
ingroup—outgroup dynamics along ideologically determined ethno-national lines. Fencing 
Hungary both ideologically and physically, Orbán was able to offer ingroup membership to 
all prepared to accept the boundaries of ‘us’ he proposed, and recognize him as the leader of 
the nation. He went against the EU and identified Hungary as a no-refugee zone, refusing 
to adhere to the principles of international human rights and EU law. This way, an ethno-
culturally constructed ideological differentiation became the basis of new ingroup-outgroup 
dynamics.
5. Conclusions
In this paper I argued that populism is a degraded form of democratic politics that seeks 
to eliminate its political rivals while maintaining popular legitimation through multiparty 
elections. Whether on the left or the right side of the political spectrum, populism is always 
illiberal. It projects a unidimensional political space in which populist contenders represent 
themselves as the true and only true representatives of the people, rejecting the legitimacy of 
any other claim to power. This way, populists simplify complicated social and political reality, 
and seek to reduce effective political choice. Hence, they reduce political transaction costs.
Political transaction costs, I argued, are the costs of conducting horizontal political 
exchange among autonomous political actors. Being the legitimate representatives of their 
own convictions and interests without being institutionally subordinated to any other political 
actors, members of democratic societies impose significant political transaction costs on 
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each other by making political exchange unpredictable, situated in a multidimensional social 
space. As societies cannot always afford to bear these costs, populism appears to be in need 
from time to time even in rich, developed, first world countries.
I also argued that leftwing populists tend to redistribute to the benefit of the poor and 
use socialism or Marxism as an ideological basis. Rightwing populists, in turn, typically 
redistribute less, and place political emphasis on ethno-cultural nationalism. Both left- and 
rightwing populists tend to be anti-liberal and authoritarian, as a number of examples in Latin 
America and elsewhere suggest. A new type of North-Western European rightwing populism 
tends to exhibit an increasingly liberal worldview with respect to individual freedoms – as 
long as the freedom of migrants and refugees are not concerned.
Apart from the left-right political divide, populists – as many other anti-liberal political 
regime – apply ingroup-outgroup dynamics to structure political space. Members of ingroups 
are preferred by redistributive policies (and often also by symbolic politics). They are part 
of the official ‘us’, and they are meant to be the social core of the regime. Their interests are 
served by the regime and their systematic advantages are presented as legitimate politically. 
That is why corruption charges often remain non-effective against populist regimes: They 
are of course corrupt in the sense of systematically preferring particular groups of society, 
but this is a quasi-legitimate political pattern as long as they prefer members of the ingroup.
Both the left-right divide and the ingroup-outgroup divide reduce political transaction 
costs by conditioning political exchange and reducing effective political choice. This way, 
redistributive patterns get stabilized and the allocation of power may remain unchanged 
over a protracted period of time. Importantly, this is not to say that predictability of political 
actions increases from the point of view of individual political or business actors.9 The 
rule of law, in fact, deteriorates. What becomes more predictable and hence eliminates a 
considerable amount of uncertainties surrounding political exchange is the survival of the 
regime with its patterns of redistribution and allocation of power. In societies characterized 
by a limited capacity of people to hold their government accountable and impose checks 
on power, such political stability appears attractive as opposed to its alternative, which is 
essentially anarchy.10 In other words, societies that lack formal and informal institutions and 
their mutual reinforcement necessary for maintaining liberal democracy, populism becomes 
a viable political option of maintaining a ‘degraded form of democracy’ – and hence avoiding 
outright dictatorship.
I argued that this is what precisely happened in Hungary after 2010. Having experienced 
a deepening political and economic crisis of liberal democratic governance in the late 2000s, 
Hungarians identified Vikor Orbán’s illiberal approach to power as a promising alternative 
of a more stable and predictable political regime. Orbán’s reign well might be corrupt, 
redistributing to the benefit of a business clientele at a mass scale, yet it provides a sufficient 
amount of benefits for a sufficient number of people in a stable and predictable manner so 
that it has a fair chance to survive the 2018 elections.
  9  I am grateful to the participants of the departmental seminar of CEU’s Department of Political Science, especially Zsolt 
Enyedi, for drawing my attention to this point.
10  Weingast (1997) associate the capability of people to hold their government accountable and curb governmental 
transgressions with the existence of ‘focal solutions’ to the problem of collective action.
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